\u3cem\u3eIdaho v. Wright\u3c/em\u3e: The Defenestration of Corroborating Evidence by Koski, John Clairborne
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
9-1-1991
Idaho v. Wright: The Defenestration of
Corroborating Evidence
John Clairborne Koski
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Evidence Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Clairborne Koski, Idaho v. Wright: The Defenestration of Corroborating Evidence, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 205 (1991)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol46/iss1/5
CASE COMMENT
Idaho v. Wright: The Defenestration of
Corroborating Evidence
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 205
11. GENERAL THEMES AND PERSPECTIVE ................................... 209
A. Child Sexual Abuse and the Law's Response ........................... 209
B. The Residual Hearsay Exception ..................................... 215
III. IDAHO v. WRIGHt. DISSECTION ......................................... 220
IV. CORROBORATION OR CONSEQUENCES .................................... 224
A. An Overview of Corroboration .......... ........................... 224
1. CASES ANALYZING CORROBORATING EVIDENCE .................... 224
2. CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME THE STATEMENT WAS MADE ......... 226
3. CORROBORATION AND THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE HEARSAY
EXCEPTIONS ................................................... 227
B. Putting Corroboration to Work ...................................... 229
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................. 233
I. INTRODUCTION
Child sexual abuse "is one of the most difficult crimes to detect
and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses
except the victim."' A successful prosecution often depends in large
part upon accusations made by the child victim. Many times a trial
turns solely on a child's out-of-court statements.2 The unique nature
of a child sexual abuse prosecution presents courts, lawmakers, prose-
cutors, and defense attorneys with a variety of complex and challeng-
ing legal questions.3 State and federal courts have become
increasingly familiar with these problems, and a growing body of case
law has emerged. The United States Supreme Court, however, has
only infrequently and tangentially passed on child sexual abuse
1. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
2. Brief of Amici Curiae American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children,
American Academy of Pediatrics, American Medical Association, National Organization for
Women, National Association of Counsel for Children, State of Rhode Island Office of the
Child Advocate, and Support Center for Child Advocates at 4, Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct.
3139 (1990) (No. 89-260) [hereinafter Brief of APSAC].
3. See Judy Yun, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex
Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1745-46 (1983); see also sources cited infra notes 31-
53.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
issues.' In Idaho v. Wright,5 the Court spoke directly to a number of
these issues.
Laura and Louis Wright had separated. As part of their arrange-
ment, they made an informal agreement to share custody of their five
and one-half year-old daughter (the "older daughter"), in which each
parent would have custody for six consecutive months.6 In November
of 1986, the older daughter told her father that her mother and her
mother's boyfriend, Robert Giles, had abused her.7 A physical exami-
nation, disclosing symptoms consistent with chronic sexual abuse,
corroborated her allegations.' The older daughter then revealed that
her half-sister (the "younger daughter"), the biological child of Laura
Wright and Robert Giles, had been subjected to the same type of
abuse.9
Doctor John Jambura, a pediatrician with extensive experience
in child sexual abuse cases,'0 performed a physical examination on the
younger daughter, then two and one-half years old, which revealed
conditions "strongly suggestive of sexual abuse with vaginal con-
tact." " After the examination, Dr. Jambura interviewed the younger
daughter in his office. 12
Although the doctor did not record the interview on audio or
video tape, later he did dictate some general notes to summarize the
conversation.' 3 On direct examination, Dr. Jambura testified that he
began the interview with the younger daughter by asking some gen-
eral questions about her relationship with her father, before turning to
more sensitive issues:
Q. [W]hat was her response to the question "Do you play with
daddy?"
A. Yes, we play-I remember her making a comment about yes
we play a lot and expanding on that and talking about spending
time with daddy.
Q. And "Does daddy play with you?" Was there any response?
A. She responded to that as well, that they played together in a
4. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012
(1988); Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39.
5. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
6. Id. at 3143.
7. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990) (No. 89-260). At
trial, "Wright was found to have held [both] her daughters down to permit... Giles... to
have sexual intercourse with each." State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1225 (Idaho 1989).
8. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Wright (No. 89-260).
9. Id.
10. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3143.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 3143-44.
13. Id. at 3144.
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variety of circumstances and, you know, seemed very unaffected by
the question.
Q. And then what did you say and her response?
A. When I asked her "Does daddy touch you with his pee-pee,"
she did admit to that. When I asked, "Do you touch his pee-pee,"
she did not have any response.
Q. Excuse me. Did you notice any change in her affect or atti-
tude in that line of questioning?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you observe?
A. She would not--oh, she did not talk any further about that.
She would not elucidate exactly-what kind of touching was tak-
ing place, or how it was happening. She did, however, say that
daddy does do this with me, but he does it a lot more with my
sister than with me.
Q. And how did she offer that last statement? Was that in
response to a question or was that just a volunteered statement?
A. That was a volunteered statement as I sat and waited for her
to respond, again after she sort of clammed-up, and that was the
next statement that she made after just allowing some silence to
occur. 
1 4
Wright and Giles were each charged with two counts of lewd
conduct with a minor."5 At trial, after a voir dire examination of the
younger daughter, the court and the parties agreed that she was "not
capable of communicating to the jury"; accordingly, the Court pro-
hibited her from testifying. 16 Over objections from Wright and Giles,
the trial court permitted Dr. Jambura to testify to the content of his
interview with the younger daughter. 7 The court admitted the
younger daughter's out-of-court statements under Idaho's residual
14. Id.
15. IDAHO CODE § 18-1508 (1987) provides:
Lewd conduct with minor or child under sixteen. Any person who shall
willfully and lewdly commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the
body or any part or member thereof of a minor or child under the age of sixteen
(16) years, including but not limited to, genital-genital contact, oral-genital
contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, or manual-
genital contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or who
shall involve a minor or child in any act of bestiality or sado-masochistic abuse or
lewd exhibition as any of such acts are defined in section 18-1507, Idaho Code,
when any of such acts are done with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or
gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or of such minor
or child, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state prison for
a term of not more than life.
16. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3143 (quoting Joint Appendix at 39, Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct.
3139 (1990) (No. 89-260)).
17. Id.
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hearsay exception. 8 Both defendants were convicted and sentenced
to twenty years imprisonment.' 9
Wright appealed from the conviction of the count involving the
younger daughter, asserting that the admission of the hearsay state-
ments violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause.20 The
Supreme Court of Idaho agreed and reversed her conviction, finding
Dr. Jambura's testimony untrustworthy because his interview tech-
nique lacked the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
required by the Clause. 2' The court emphasized that the session was
not videotaped, the questions were "blatantly leading," and the
"interrogation was performed by someone with a preconceived idea of
what the child should be disclosing. ' 22 Without additional guaran-
tees of trustworthiness, the court intimated that it would admit such
statements only if they qualified under the "excited utterance" excep-
tion to the hearsay rule.23
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Idaho decision reversing Wright's conviction.24 Although it agreed
that the younger daughter's hearsay statement did not have the par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness required for admission
18. The Idaho hearsay exception is identical to that in the Federal Rules of Evidence:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even- though the
declarant is available as a witness.
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.
IDAHO R. EvID. 803(24); FED. R. EvID. 803(24). The Uniform Rules of Evidence are also
congruent. UNIF. R. EviD. 803(24).
19. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3145.
20. Giles also appealed from the conviction on the count involving the younger daughter,
contending that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Jambura's testimony under the residual
hearsay exception. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed his conviction. State v.
Giles, 772 P.2d 191 (Idaho 1989).
21. State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1231 (Idaho 1989). The Idaho Supreme Court was
"not convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result
had the error not occurred." Id.
22. Id. at 1227.
23. Id. at 1230. The excited utterance exception, IDAHO R. EVID. 803(2) and FED. R.
EVID. 803(2), excludes from the hearsay rule "statement[s] relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition." See Wright, 775 P.2d at 1232 (Bakes, C.J., dissenting) ("The opinion seems
wrongly to conclude that a child's words are reliable when uttered excitedly.").
24. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
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under the Confrontation Clause, the Court refused to adopt the state
court's mechanical rationale.2" Instead, the Court required that the
party seeking to admit evidence show particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness "from the totality of the circumstances, [with]... the
relevant circumstances includ[ing] only those that surround the mak-
ing of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy
of belief."' 26 "To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hear-
say evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of relia-
bility by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to
other evidence at trial." 27
This Comment examines the Court's attempt to grapple with the
problems inherent in a child sexual abuse prosecution. It argues that
the Supreme Court's rationale in Wright is unnecessarily restrictive,
and that an analysis of corroborating evidence often aids in evaluating
the truthfulness of a child's hearsay statement without endangering
the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. Part II reviews general
themes in the development of the law of child sexual abuse cases and
the residual hearsay exception. Part III analyzes the Idaho state
court's restrictive test, the Supreme Court's rationale, and the alterna-
tive test proposed by the dissent. Part IV examines the approaches
courts, legislatures, and commentators have taken with respect to cor-
roborating evidence and argues that a more realistic approach is
needed. This Comment concludes that Wright's unnecessary limita-
tions on the residual hearsay exception ignore pressing issues in child
sexual abuse cases.
II. GENERAL THEMES AND PERSPECTIVE
A. Child Sexual Abuse and the Law's Response
Sexual abuse of children is as wide spread as it is tragic. In a
landmark poll conducted in 1985 by the Los Angeles Times, twenty-
seven percent of the women and sixteen percent of the men surveyed
revealed that they had been victims of sexual abuse.2" "The annual
number of new sexual abuse cases in children under the age of 18
years is in the range of 150,000 to 200,000." '29 As reports of abuse
25. Id. at 3150.
26. Id. at 3148.
27. Id. at 3150.
28. Lois Timnick, The Times Poll; 22% in Survey Were Child Abuse Victim, L.A. TIMES,
August 25, 1985, at 1; see also JOHN CREWDSON, BY SILENCE BETRAYED: SEXUAL ABUSE
OF CHILDREN IN AMERICA 29 (1988) (noting that the Los Angeles Times' survey "provid[ed]
by far the clearest picture yet of of the magnitude child sexual abuse in America").
29. Melvin Lewis, Foreward to DIANE H. SCHETKY & ARTHUR H. GREEN, CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE: A HANDBOOK FOR HEALTH CARE AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS at v (1988).
1991]
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become more common and cases work their way through the courts,
new and challenging issues arise for both courts and litigants.3"
Child sexual abuse is a crime of secrecy. 3I As there is often little
or no corroborating evidence, a case may turn solely upon the child's
accusations. 32 A child may make these allegations of abuse in a vari-
ety of ways, to a variety of people, and in a variety of circumstances,
not all lending themselves to credibility.33 Repeated interviewing and
leading questions further damage the credibility of the child's story,
which originally may have been quite trustworthy. Any inconsistent
testimony allows the defendant to attack the child's credibility.34 In
securing a conviction, the prosecution must overcome juror bias
against the child's credibility35 and perhaps a bias in favor of the
accused, who may be a respected member of the community.36
Issues of suggestibility and accuracy of children's memories fur-
ther complicate child sexual abuse cases. 37 Recent empirical studies
have largely disproven traditional scientific assumptions doubting the
reliability of child witnesses.3 S Some commentators take the extreme
position that a child's allegations must be true simply because
"[c]hildren don't lie, and don't imagine the sexually explicit acts that
they are describing. ' 39 The weight of authority, however, suggests
that false accusations are rare, but may occur under several specific
30. See, e.g., Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523 (1988);
Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis
or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1989); Yun, supra note 3; Katrin E. Frank, Note,
Confronting Child Victims of Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of the Sexual Abuse Hearsay
Exception, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 387 (1984).
31. See JOHN E.B. MYERS, CHILD WITNESS LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.32, at 329 (1987);
C.J. Flammang, Interviewing Child Victims of Sex Offenders, in THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY
OF YOUTH 175, 177 (Leroy G. Schultz ed., 1980).
32. Leroy G. Schultz, The Child Sex Victim: Social, Psychological and Legal Perspectives,
52 CHILD WELFARE 147, 148 (1973).
33. Brief of APSAC, supra note 2, at 6-7 (noting that children may reveal allegations to
parents, teachers, pediatricians, family doctors, emergency room physicians, police officers,
therapists, or other trusted adults).
34. See FED. R. EvID. 613.
35. See Gail S. Goodman et al., When a Child Takes the Stand: Jurors Perceptions of
Children's Eyewitness Testimony, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1987).
36. See Dirk Lorenzen, Note, The Admissibility of Expert Psychological Testimony in Cases
Involving the Sexual Misuse of a Child, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1038 & n.34 (1988).
37. On children's ability to testify accurately, see Gail S. Goodman & Rebecca S. Reed,
Age Differences in Eyewitness Testimony, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 317 (1986); Barbara V.
Marin et al., The Potential of Children as Eyewitnesses, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 295 (1979);
Dominic J. Fot6, Note, Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Criminal Proceedings. Their
Capabilities, Special Problems, and Proposals for Reform, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 157 (1985).
38. Fot6, supra note 37, at 158 (citing Marin et al., supra note 37, at 303-04).
39. Lada I. Tamarack, Fifty Myths and Facts About Incest, in SEXUAL ABUSE OF
CHILDREN IN THE 1980's at 3 (Benjamin Schlesinger ed., 1986).
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circumstances40 For example, although a child's ability to recount
events is generally comparable to adult ability, children tend to be
more susceptible to suggestion than adults.41 Another study revealed
that five- to six-year-old children may provide eyewitness accounts
that exceed the accuracy of adult accounts, if the children are ques-
tioned in a nonsuggestive manner. 2
Information regarding the true extent of a child's capacities can-
not be considered fully without examining how a layperson, as juror,
will evaluate the child's testimony. While empirical studies of this
issue are still new, early work suggests a distinct bias against chil-
dren's credibility.4 3 Although a child's accusation was once consid-
ered quite damaging and caused many defense lawyers to advise
clients to plead guilty in the face of a child's accusation, now, as a
result of the publicity over the Jordan and McMartin cases," "many
lawyers have reached the conclusion that child sexual abuse cases are
'defensible,' by which they mean that children can be intimidated and
confused into withholding information, giving incorrect answers, or
seeming untruthful when in fact they are not."'45 Jurors, and perhaps
even judges, also may share a disbelief that "the young victims's inju-
ries were willfully caused or risked or that they were results of insensi-
tive indifference to an order justifying punishment. '46 This disbelief
may stem from a suspicion that a parent may initiate charges of child
sexual abuse for ulterior motives such as a concurrent divorce pro-
ceeding, custody battle, or other reasons of personal vengeance.4 ,
Although empirical evidence of children's capacities and jurors' per-
ceptions reveal a cross-current of attitudes, the data is far from com-
40. See DIANE H. SCHETKY & ARTHUR H. GREEN, True and False Allegations of Child
Sexual Abuse, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: A HANDBOOK FOR HEALTH CARE AND LEGAL
PROFESSIONALS 108-09 (1988). The authors describe seven situations in which false
allegations are made: (1) where a parent brainwashes the child in order to punish the other
spouse; (2) where a parent influences the child by projecting unconscious sexual fantasies onto
the child; (3) where the child's allegations are based upon fantasies; (4) where the child makes
false allegations for revenge; (5) where third parties initiate the allegations; (6) where exposure
to other sexual abuse cases causes the child to make allegations; and (7) where a child's
unrelated medical problems give rise to suspicion of sexual abuse. Id.; see also id. at 113-16
(discussing relevant case studies).
41. Goodman & Reed, supra note 37, at 328.
42. See Marin et al., supra note 37, at 304.
43. Goodman et al., supra note 35, at 36.
44. See, e.g., Thomas L. Feher, The Alleged Molestation Victim, the Rules of Evidence, and
the Constitution: Should Children Really Be Seen and Not Heard, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 227,
239-41; Debra C. Moss, Are the Children Lying, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1987, at 59.
45. CREWDSON, supra note 28, at 166.
46. B.M. Dickens, Child Abuse and Criminal Process: Dilemmas in Punishment and
Protection, in CHILD ABUSE 80 (A. Carmi & H. Zimm eds., 1984).
47. Id.
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plete, leaving many undetermined variables for prosecutors and
defense attorneys to consider.48
Most child sexual abuse cases never reach trial. 49 The difficulties
inherent in a child physically taking the stand and testifying-a syn-
drome Professor David Libai characterizes as "legal process
trauma"-complicate the cases that do go to trial. 5° Libai describes
several aspects of a legal proceeding that traumatize a child: repeated
questioning, facing the accused, the courtroom's imposing atmos-
phere, and the ultimate conviction of a molester who is the victim's
parent, relative, or friend.5 Although the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the impact of this phenomenon once before, 2 Libai's article has
not provoked discussion in other federal courts. 53
The United States Supreme Court took a dramatic step towards
recognizing the state's interest in protecting children from potential
trauma in Maryland v. Craig.54 A Maryland statute allowed for an
alleged child victim of sexual abuse to testify via closed circuit televi-
sion, out of the presence of the defendant.5 5  Although the child
could not see the accused, both attorneys were with the child, and the
judge, jury, and defendant viewed the testimony in the courtroom via
closed circuit television.56 The State asserted that the legislature
48. Perhaps one of the most unexpected complications in reaching a deserved guilty
verdict is presented where a pedophile serves on the jury. While conceding that "most jurors
are not child molesters," one author notes that, with the prevalence of child sexual abuse, "a
jury may contain at least one member who shares the defendant's sexual attraction to
children." CREWDSON, supra note 28, at 168. The author reports a case where, after the jury
had reached an 11-1 deadlock, the foreman sent a note to the trial judge inquiring: "'Is it
misconduct that one of the people on the jury says he feels that what the defendant did was no
big deal because he regularly has sex with eleven- and twelve-year-old-girls?'" Id.
49. See id. at 102-08.
50. David Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal
Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 983 (1969).
51. Id. at 984; see also RUTH S. KEMPE & C. HENRY KEMPE, THE COMMON SECRET:
SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 85 (Richard C. Atkinson et al. eds., 1984)
("Being required to appear as a witness in both the juvenile and criminal court cases may be
traumatic to the child victim .... This is especially true in a criminal court case where cross
examination of the victim by a hostile attorney is allowed by the adversary court process.").
52. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 618 & n.7 (1987).
53. Search of WESTLAW, ALLFEDS database (August 20, 1991). In contract, among
commentators Libai's article has provoked substantial discussion. It is cited 41 times in other
periodicals. Search of WESTLAW, TP-ALL database (August 20, 1991). Yet, the federal
courts have only cited Libai's article once, in Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 618 n.7.
54. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). For a thoughtful critique of Craig, see
Brian L. Schwalb, Child Abuse Trials and the Confrontation of Traumatized Witnesses.-
Defining "Confrontation" to Protect both Children and Defendants, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 185 (1991).
55. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3160-61 (citing MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-
102(a)(1)(ii) (1989)).
56. Id. at 3161.
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designed the statute to protect the child victim from the trauma of
testifying in court in the presence of the accused." In addressing the
defendant's Confrontation Clause rights, the Court held that
where necessary to protect a child witness from trauma that would
be caused by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant, at
least where such trauma would impair the child's ability to com-
municate, the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit use of a pro-
cedure that, despite the absence of face-to-face confrontation,
ensures the reliability of the evidence by subjecting it to rigorous
adversarial testing and thereby preserves the essence of effective
confrontation. 8
After Craig, parents may be more willing to allow their children
to testify if the courtroom environment is less traumatic and less
likely to cause the child great emotional harm.5 9 Further, now that
courts can prevent a defendant accused with child sexual abuse from
communicating with the alleged victim once the allegation is made,
prosecutors must be extremely careful in relying on the statements of
the child victim." The Court's recognition of this trauma and its
usurpation of the right to "physical" confrontation shows the need for
prosecutors to exercise extreme care in determining whether to bring
a case.
6 1
57. Id.
58. Id. at 3170. In dissent, Justice Scalia accused the majority of ignoring the plain
language of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 3172 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Addressing the
strength of the State's interest, Scalia wrote:
The State's interest here is in fact no more and no less than what the State's
interest always is when it seeks to get a class of evidence admitted in criminal
proceedings: more convictions of guilty defendants. That is not an unworthy
interest, but it should not be dressed up as a humanitarian one.
Id. at 1375 (footnote omitted). Scalia intimated that if the State wished to protect the child
from the trauma of the legal proceedings, the State should not call the child as a witness. Id
59. See Libai, supra note 50, at 1014-25 (discussing the "child courtroom").
60. Justice-Scalia presented the following scenario:
A father whose young daughter has been given over to the exclusive custody of
his estranged wife, or a mother whose young son has been taken into custody by
the State's child welfare department, is sentenced to prison for sexual abuse on
the basis of testimony by a child the parent has not seen or spoken to for many
months; and the guilty verdict is rendered without giving the parent so much as
the opportunity to sit in the presence of the child, and to ask, personally or
through counsel, "it is really not true, is it, that I-your father (or mother)
whom you see before you-did these terrible things?"
Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3172 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. See, e.g., Libai, supra note 50, at 983 (coining and discussing "legal process trauma");
Gary B. Melton, Psycholegal Issues in Child Victim's Interaction with the Legal System, 5
VICTIMOLOGY 274 (1980); see also Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3175-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing the debacle of the Jordan, Minnesota investigation).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Ultimately, the goal of a child sexual abuse prosecution is to pun-
ish the truly guilty:
There are historic doctrines teaching that an acquittal is never a
failure, since society rejoices in public demonstration that the law
has not been violated; more recent perceptions are that acquittal
shows only injustice, in that either an innocent person has been put
to the trouble and expense of defending a prosecution, or a guilty
person has gone free.62
Beyond these concerns, prosecutors must be aware of the tremendous
stigma the mere allegation of such a crime entails.
Because of the singular problems of child sexual abuse cases, the
hearsay rule and its exceptions play a significant part in determining
their outcome.63 As Professor Myers has noted, "Nowhere is the
need for out-of-court statements greater than in child abuse litiga-
tion. ' 64 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that the goal of
"society to protect the welfare of children ... is no mere corporate
concern of official authority. It is the interest of youth itself, and of
the whole community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses
and given opportunities for growth into free and independent... citi-
zens." 65 Society's ability to protect children ultimately turns on the
success of deserved prosecutions.
Toward this end, the rules of evidence, especially the exceptions
to the hearsay rule, play a crucial role. Of the many hearsay excep-
tions, only a handful are used frequently in child sexual abuse prose-
cutions.66  The excited utterance exception-perhaps the most
frequently used 67-allows for the admissibility of hearsay statements
"relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant
was under the stress or excitement caused by the event or condi-
tion."'68 The common law "state of mind" exception, codified as Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 803(3), allows for the admission of statements
"of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or
physical condition. 69 The exception for statements made for the pur-
62. Dickens, supra note 46, at 83.
63. See Randy Curry & Carrol Crow, Liberalization in the Admissibility of Evidence in
Child Abuse and Child Molestation Cases, 7 J. Juv. L. 205 (1983).
64. Brief of APSAC, supra note 2, at 5.
65. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
66. MYERS, supra note 31, § 5.31, at 326.
67. Id. § 5.33, at 329.
68. FED. R. EvID. 803(2); see also MYERS, supra note 31, § 5.33, at 329-44; Yun, supra
note 3, at 1753-59.
69. FED. R. EvID. 803(3). Rule 803(3) allows the admission of:
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or
physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
[Vol. 46:205
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poses of medical diagnosis or treatment also is significant in child sex-
ual abuse cases.7" Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
recognize a specific exception for statements related to child sexual
abuse,7 ' many states have developed such exceptions.72 Finally, the
residual hearsay exception features prominently in litigation involving
child sexual abuse.
Before Wright, the Supreme Court had not led in the develop-
ment of child sexual abuse law. Although the Court has addressed
specific issues concerning the accused's right to face-to-face confron-
tation with the witness,73 Wright was the first case to inquire into the
other side of the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in child
sexual abuse cases-the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
required for the admission of a hearsay statement. The Court's opin-
ion in Wright is therefore important in three respects: (1) in develop-
ing of the Court's voice in child sex abuse cases, (2) in providing
guidelines for the residual hearsay exception, and (3) in continuing
the development of Confrontation Clause doctrine.
B. The Residual Hearsay Exception
The residual hearsay exception has had unexpected significance
in the area of child sexual abuse cases.74 One court has noted that
"[t]he residual hearsay exception appears to find its greatest use in
trials where children are the victims of alleged sexual abuse."' 75 Given
the controversial nature of the residual hearsay exception and child
sexual abuse cases, Idaho v. Wright will not be the last word in the
debate, but it will frame future discussion and argument.
Evaluating the trustworthiness of a witness's testimony involves
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will.
Id.
70. FED. R. EvID. 803(4); see also Mosteller, supra note 30. Prosecutors in Wright did not
argue that the younger daughter's statements to Dr. Jambura would qualify under Idaho's
equivalent of Rule 803(4).
71. But see UNIF. R. EVID. 807 (concerning child victims and witnesses).
72. See MYERS, supra note 31, § 5.38, at 372-77; Graham, supra note 30, at 534-37; Yun,
supra note 3, at 1763-66; Frank, supra note 30, at 387.
73. See Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021
(1988); see also The Supreme Court, 1989 Term, Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 132-
39 (1990).
74. See Michael S. Child, Effective Use of Residual Hearsay, ARMY LAW., July, 1985, at
24; Graham, supra note 30, at 530-33; Frank M. Tuerkheimer, Convictions Through Hearsay in
Child Sex Abuse Cases: A Logical Progression Back to Square One, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 47
(1988); Yun, supra note 3, at 1761-63.
75. United States v. Barror, 20 M.J. 501, 503 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985) (applying MIL. R. EVID.
804(b)(5), which is identical to FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5)), rev'd, 23 M.J. 370 (C.M.A. 1987).
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four risks: perception, memory, narration, and sincerity.7 6 Analyzing
the trustworthiness of an out-of-court statement presents the same
risks. This is especially true for out-of-court statements offered into
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted-"hearsay"
statements.
The general rule against the admission of hearsay statements
7
evolved from the defendant's inability to cross-examine the declarant,
which prohibited the jury from examining the trustworthiness of the
witness's testimony.79 Courts developed exceptions to the rule against
hearsay for certain statements that were considered inherently trust-
worthy, such as excited utterances,80 recorded recollection,8" business
records,8 2 dying declarations,8 3 and statements against interest.8 4 The
Federal Rules of Evidence have codified twenty-seven specific hearsay
exceptions. 5
In addition to the specific hearsay exceptions, the Federal Rules
of Evidence include two other enumerated hearsay exceptions, rules
803(24) and 804(b)(5).16 These exceptions-commonly referred to as
76. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee introductory note; Edward M. Morgan,
Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REv. 177, 218
(1948).
77. Rule 801 defines "hearsay":
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal
conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.
FED. R. EVID. 801.
78. FED. R. EVID. 802.
79. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 290 (1974).
80. EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 297, at 855 (3d ed. 1984)
(discussing FED. R. EVID. 803(2)).
81. The recorded recollection exception has "long been favored by the federal and
practically all the state courts that have had occasion to decide the question." United States v.
Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 770 (2d Cir. 1965) (discussing exception now codified as FED. R. EVID.
803(5)).
82. CLEARY, supra note 80, at 873-75 (discussing exception now recognized as FED. R.
EVID. 803(6)).
83. The King v. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (K.B. 1789) (discussing exception
now recognized as FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2)).
84. Higham v. Ridgway, 103 Eng. Rep. 717, 721 (K.B. 1808) (discussing exception now
recognized as FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3)).
85. FED R. EvID. 803(l)-(23), 804(b)(l)-(4).
86. Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) are identical, except the latter applies only when the
declarant is "unavailable" as determined by FED. R. EVID. 804(a). See Huff v. White Motor
Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 291 n.4 (7th Cir. 1979) ("The two provisions are identical, and Rule
804(b)(5) is therefore redundant, since 803(24) applies whether or not the declarant is a
witness."); United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 764-66 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Accordingly, cases
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the "residual" or "catchall" ' exceptions-have proved to be "one of
the most controversial features of the Federal Rules."88 Wigmore's
early work on the law of evidence was the impetus for the residual
hearsay exceptions.8 9 Wigmore's analysis denoted two common char-
acteristics shared by the established hearsay exceptions: necessity of
use and circumstantial probability of trustworthiness.9' In the same
year Wigmore's work was published, a federal court first used Wig-
more's analysis to admit hearsay evidence solely "upon principle,"
rather than stretching the definition of an existing exception, or
inventing a new class to accommodate the exception. 9 State courts
also began to admit hearsay evidence not in existing common law cat-
egories if the evidence proved to be both necessary and trustworthy. 92
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence recognized Dallas
County v. Commercial Assurance Co.93 as the leading case on the
residual hearsay exception. In Dallas County, the county sued its
insurer to recover damages for the collapse of the clock tower on the
county courthouse. The insurance company denied liability, claiming
that structural weakness, not covered under the county's policy,
caused the collapse.94 An examination of the wreckage revealed char-
coal and charred timbers that, according to the county's expert wit-
ness at trial, had been caused by a lightening strike.95
At trial, the parties presented more conflicting evidence on the
cause of the collapse of the clock tower. The county's witnesses testi-
decided under 803(24) provide authority for 804(b)(5) cases, and vice versa. 1 MICHAEL H.
GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE 253 (1989).
87. "The rules have also been called the 'open-ended exceptions,' the 'federal common law
exceptions,' and, simply, the 'other' hearsay exceptions." Lizbeth A. Turner, Comment,
Admission of Grand Jury Testimony Under the Residual Hearsay Exception, 59 TUL. L. REv.
1033, 1033 n.3 (1985).
88. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the Federal
Rules of.Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 239, 240 (1978).
89. G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publishing Co., 207 F. 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1913)
(citing JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1st ed. 1913)) (affirming and reprinting Judge Learned
Hand's unpublished district court decision), appeal dismissedfor want ofjurisdiction, 237 U.S.
618 (1915)..
90. Id. (citing JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1421, 1422, 1690 (1st ed. 1913)).
91. Id.
92. See Gary W. Majors, Comment, Admitting "Near Misses" Under the Residual Hearsay
Exception, 66 OREGON L. REV. 599, 602 & nn.18-22 (citing Perry v. Parker, 141 A.2d 883
(N.H. 1958) and Goodale v. Murray, 289 N.W. 450 (Iowa 1940) as seminal state cases).
93. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961). The Advisory Committee cites Dallas County on the
Federal Rules of Evidence as an illustrative case. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR
UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 162 (West 1990); see also SENATE COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, FED. R. EVID., S. REP. No. 1227, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7065.
94. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, supra note 93, at 7065.
95. Dallas County, 286 F.2d at 390.
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fled that they saw lightening strike the tower.9 6 The insurance com-
pany's experts testified that lightening could not have struck the
tower without causing the collapse. 97 To support its contention that
lightening did not cause the charcoal residue, the insurer sought to
introduce a fifty-eight year-old unsigned newspaper account of a fire
at the courthouse. 98 The trial judge admitted the evidence on the the-
ory that the account qualified under the business records exception.9
The court of appeals upheld the admission of the newspaper account
not because it qualified under a traditional exception, but because the
statement was "necessary and trustworthy, relevant and material, and
its admission [was] within the trial judge's exercise of discretion.""''
The success of Dallas County and its progeny set the stage for the
battle over a residual exception during the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.' 0'
In 1965, Chief Justice Warren appointed an advisory committee
to draft rules of evidence for use in the federal courts. 102 Ten years
later, after much debate and compromise, Congress ratified the final
draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 103 Professor Imwinkelreid, in
a review of the enactment of the residual hearsay exception, con-
cluded that "the legislative history materials are self-contradic-
tory."'" Cases involving the residual hearsay exception also present
analytical difficulty, and as one commentator noted, "precedent is
of limited value, and any attempt to distill from the decisions very
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 391.
100. Id. at 398 (citing G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publishing Co., 207 F. 515, 518
(2d Cir. 1913), as precedent).
101. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 419 U.S.
1096 (1974); Butler v. Southern Pac. Co., 431 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 401 U.S.
975 (1971); Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 415 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1057 (1970); United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 1134 (10th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Castellana, 349 F.2d
264 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 928 (1966); Price v. United States, 335 F.2d 671 (5th
Cir. 1964); United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). For a summary of the
Fifth Circuit post-Dallas County cases mentioned above, see Scott M. Lewis, The Residual
Hearsay Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Shuffling the Wild Cards, 15 RUTGERS L.J.
101, 105-09 (1983).
102. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES at
III (West 1990).
103. Id.
104. Imwinkelried, supra note 89, at 258; see also 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER
B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 923 (1980) ("[T]he meaning of Rule 803(24) is suffused in
the gray light of ambivalence, by virtue of its legislative history."). Indeed, in Wright, neither
the majority nor dissent paid attention to legislative history in construing the residual
exception.
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much in the way of particularity would be not only futile, but
counterproductive." 0 5
The language of the residual hearsay exception rule imposes five
requirements to justify the admission of a statement. 0 6 Four of these
requirements are not extraordinary and have not resulted in signifi-
cant litigation. The hearsay statement must be necessary to the
case, 10 7 offered as evidence of a material fact, 08 must satisfy the gen-
eral purposes of the rules, 1°9 and notice must be given to the opposing
party."O The fifth and most significant requirement is that the state-
ment must possess "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"
that are "equivalent" to the other enumerated exceptions.I' The fac-
tors that courts have used to determine the trustworthiness of a
child's statement in child sexual abuse cases include: whether the
child made the statement under oath; the child's availability for cross-
105. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 104, at 924.
106. Beyond the language of the rule, the hearsay exception must meet the requirements of
the Confrontation Clause. The Sixth Amendment requires that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). To meet this requirement, the Supreme
Court has stated that to be admissible a hearsay statement must fall in a traditional exception,
or present "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66
(1980). Because this language tracks the wording of FED. R. EvID. 803(24), the Confrontation
Clause does not place an additional burden on the admission of a residual hearsay exception.
"If it's good enough for the Federal Rules of Evidence, it's good enough for the confrontation
clause." GRAHAM, supra note 86, at 313.
The legislative history states that Congress intended 803(24) to be used "very rarely and
only in exceptional circumstances." SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FED. RULES OF
EVIDENCE, S. REP. No. 1227, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7051, 7065-66. In large part, district courts have used their wide discretion to ignore this
language. United States v. American Cynamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859, 865-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Further, the need for a child's testimony in a child sexual abuse prosecution often qualifies as
an "exceptional circumstance." See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987),
aff'd, 484 U.S. 10687 (1988); United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1444 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474 (8th
Cir. 1985).
107. A statement is necessary if it is "more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts." FED.
R. EVID. 803(24)(B); see also GRAHAM, supra note 86, at 256 n.392.
108. FED. R. EVID. 803(24)(A).
109. FED. R. EVID. 803(24)(C). This requirement appears to be no more than a
restatement of Rule 102, which provides:
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the
law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined.
FED. R. EVID. 102.
110. See CLEARY, supra note 80, at 909; GRAHAM, supra note 86, at 257-58.
111. FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
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examination at trial; procedural regularity; out-of-court reliance by
others; the child's motivation to speak truthfully; the child's compe-
tence to testify; the child's bias or partiality; the number of persons
who overheard the statement; whether the statement was written or
oral; the level of certainty of the facts described; whether the child
uttered the statement spontaneously; whether more than one child
made the same statement; the child's age and maturity; the nature and
duration of abuse; the adult incentive to invent or shape allegations;
admission by the defendant; abnormal behavior following contact
with the defendant; opportunity for personal knowledge; time lapse
between the event and the statement; whether the statement tends to
be against the declarant's interest; the influence of leading questions;
and, in some instances, the presence or absence of corroborating or
inconsistent facts."12
III. IDAHO V. WRIGHT: DISSECTION
In Idaho v. Wright, the Supreme Court addressed problems
raised by the intersection of a child sexual abuse case and the hearsay
rule." 3 In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Court held
that the hearsay statements by an alleged child sexual abuse victim to
her examining pediatrician concerning her own abuse, made in
response to the pediatrician's questions, did not have the particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness required for admission under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment."' 4 The significance of
Wright lies in the factors the Court considered in determining
whether the child's statement contained particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.
In reversing Wright's conviction, the Idaho Supreme Court laid
down a rigid formula for protecting the defendant's Confrontation
Clause rights. The Idaho court ruled that out-of-court statements
made by an alleged child victim of sexual abuse would be admissible
only if the child made the declarations either with several specific pro-
cedural safeguards,"I5 or the child's statements otherwise amounted to
112. See, e.g., CLEARY, supra note 80, at 908-09; GRAHAM, supra note 86, at 254-55;
LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 104, at 926-33; MYERS, supra note 31, § 5.37, at 362-72.
Of course, some of these requirements overlap, and many of them could fall in a broad
category of "corroboration." The commentators and courts disagree how to group these
factors. The issue of corroboration will be discussed in more detail, infra Part IV.
113. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
114. Id. at 3145.
115. State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1231 (Idaho 1989) (Bakes, C.J., dissenting):
As I deduce from the opinion's analysis, from now on all hearsay statements by
very young children are inadmissible unless they are either (1) uttered
spontaneously and excitedly, or (2) made in response to "open-ended" questions
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"excited utterances ... or part of the res gestae."" 16 In dissent, Chief
Justice Bakes noted the practical difficulty in applying the majority's
test: trustworthy revelations of child sexual abuse may, and fre-
quently do, arise outside of the clinical conditions required by the
majority. 17 Instead, the dissent would require the court to determine
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" and "indicia of relia-
bility" from all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the mak-
ing of the statement."II Applying this test to the facts, the dissent
concluded that the signs of physical abuse and the older daughter's
statements constituted sufficient indicia of reliability to admit the
younger daughter's out-of-court statements." 9
The Supreme Court's decision in Wright affirmed the Idaho
Supreme Court in result, but declined to follow its rationale. 120 The
Court used a two-step process laid out in Ohio v. Roberts"'2 to deter-
mine when hearsay statements comport with the Confrontation
Clause. First, the prosecution must show the unavailability of the
declarant.'22 As the younger daughter's unavailability was not at
issue, 123 the Court proceeded to the second step, which allows admis-
sion of an out-of-court statement "only if it bears adequate 'indicia of
reliability.' ",124 These indicia are present if: (1) the statement comes
within a traditionally rooted hearsay exception, 25 or (2) the state-
ment is supplemented by "a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." 2
6
The Supreme Court agreed with the Idaho court that the Con-
frontation Clause prohibited the admission of the younger daughter's
out-of-court statements, but not because of a "preconceived and artifi-
cial litmus test for the procedural propriety of professional interviews
in which children make hearsay statements against a defendant."' 127
from a specially trained professional during a videotaped interview and the
evidence establishes that the child's memory was not "confabulated" by previous
improper interviews.
116. Id. at 1230. Note that "[tihe term res gestae is carefully avoided in the Federal Rules
of Evidence.... [It] is improper and should be avoided." MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 308 (2d ed. 1988).
117. Wright, 775 P.2d at 1232; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
118. Id. at 1231.
119. Id.
120. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3148 (1990).
121. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
122. Id. at 65.
123. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3147.
124. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quotations omitted).
125. See FED. R. EVID. 803(l)-(23), 804(b)(l)-(4).
126. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
127. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3148. The Wright opinion noted that while the Idaho court's
procedural safeguards may add to the reliability of some statements, they also may "in many
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It instead stated that the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
must "be drawn from the totality of the circumstances that surround
the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly
worthy of belief."' 28 The Court noted several appropriate factors in
this evaluation: a child's "spontaneity and consistent repetition,"' 29
the child's mental state at the time of the declaration, 3 0 the "use of
terminology unexpected of a child of similar age," 13 ' and a "lack of
motive to fabricate."'' 32
Wright's test of an out-of-court statement's trustworthiness ends
here: a court must judge the reliability of the out-of-court statement
solely by its inherent trustworthiness. 33 Wright failed to recognize
the State's argument that "evidence corroborating the truth of a hear-
say statement may properly support a finding that the statement bears
'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' "a134 Indeed, Wright
states that such evidence would "permit admission of a presumptively
unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other
evidence at trial."'' 3 5  According to Wright, the presence of cor-
roborating evidence is relevant only to the issue of whether the error
was harmless. 3 6
The Idaho trial judge relied on several factors in admitting the
younger daughter's testimony: (1) she had no motive to fabricate, (2)
it was unlikely that her story was made up, (3) the injuries occurred
while she was in the defendant's custody, (4) the older daughter had
testified as to the identification of the abusers, and (5) the medical
evidence documented physical abuse. 3 7 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, found only the first two factors related to "circumstances sur-
rounding the making of the statements."'' 3 8 Weighing these factors
along with the "suggestive manner in which Dr. Jambura conducted
instances be inappropriate or unnecessary to a determination whether a given statement is
sufficiently trustworthy for Confrontation Clause purposes." Id.
128. Id. at 3149. In dissent, Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority's analysis up to this
point: "My disagreement is with the rule the Court invents to control this inquiry, and with
the Court's ultimate determination that the statements in question here must be inadmissible
as violative of the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 3153 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
129. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3150 (citing State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 811 (Ariz. 1987)).
130. Id. (citing Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1988)).
131. Id. (citing State v. Sorenson, 421 N.W.2d 77, 85 (Wis. 1988)).
132. Id. (citing State v. Kuone, 757 P.2d 289, 292-93 (Kan. 1988)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 3150-51, 3151 n.*.
137. Id. at 3152.
138. Id.
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the interview,"' 39 the Court found that there was "no special reason
for supposing that the incriminating statements were particularly
trustworthy."'' Ultimately, "[g]iven the presumption of inadmissi-
bility accorded accusatory hearsay statements not admitted pursuant
to a firmly rooted hearsay exception,"' 4 ' the Court concluded that the
state had failed to meet its burden of showing that the daughter's
statement contained particularized guarantees "so trustworthy that
adversarial testing would add little to its reliability."' 42 Accordingly,
the statement did not satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Kennedy, in a brief dissenting opinion joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Blackmun, argued that the
Court should consider corroborating evidence when analyzing the
trustworthiness of a hearsay statement. 43 Kennedy agreed with the
foundation of the Court's opinion; however, Kennedy would expand
the test to look beyond the circumstances surrounding the making of
the statement and examine the presence of corroborating evidence.
Kennedy asserted that "[i]t is a matter of common sense for most
people that one of the best ways to determine whether what someone
says is trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated by other evidence."'"
Not only did the dissent find the inquiry relevant, but it could find no
justification for prohibiting such analysis. Kennedy noted that courts
frequently use corroborating evidence to evaluate the trustworthiness
of out-of-court statements made by co-defendants,' 45 in determining
whether the police may act on the basis of an informant's tip,' 46 and
indeed, in supporting a finding that a child's statements are reliable. m4
Justice Kennedy's test would look beyond "the narrow circumstances
in which the statement was made,"' 48 and would provide evidence
that "can be assessed by the defendant and addressed by the trial
court in an objective and critical way."'' 49 Kennedy would have
remanded the case to consider whether the corroborating factors evi-
denced particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.'50
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986)).
142. Id. at 3149, 3152-53.
143. Id. at 3153 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 3155; see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 180 (1987).
146. Id. at 3156.
147. Id. at 3154 n.2.
148. Id. at 3156.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 3156-57.
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IV- CORROBORATION OR CONSEQUENCES
A. An Overview of Corroboration
Many courts have passed on residual hearsay cases.151 "Not sur-
prisingly, these decisions have... been analytically inconsistent."' 152
Although there is no exhaustive list of factors that courts consult to
determine the "trustworthiness" of a hearsay statement, certain fac-
tors continue to reappear in child sexual abuse cases. 153 The most
significant disagreement among the cases is whether a court can con-
sider corroborating evidence in determining whether to admit a hear-
say statement under the residual exception.I54 In a child sexual abuse
case, one court defined corroborative evidence as "evidence, direct or
circumstantial, that is independent of and supplementary to the
child's hearsay statement and that tends to confirm that the act
described in the child's statement actually occurred."'' 5 5 Some courts
have refused to examine anything beyond the circumstances sur-
rounding the making of the out-of-court statement, 156 while other
courts have considered corroborating evidence in their determination
of trustworthiness. 57 Finally, several state legislatures have adopted
child abuse hearsay exception statutes that require courts to consider
corroborating evidence. 158
1. CASES ANALYZING CORROBORATING EVIDENCE
Courts of Appeals for the First, 59 Second,'0 Third,'6' Fourth,162
151. See, John L. Ross, Confrontation and Residual Hearsay: A Critical Examination, and
a Proposal for Military Courts, 118 MIL. L. REV. 31, 31 n.6 (1987) (listing cases).
152. Id. at 31-33.
153. See supra text accompanying note 112.
154. See Jonathan E. Grant, The Equivalent Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness
Standard for Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24), 90 DICK. L. REV. 75, 94-95 (1985); Ross,
supra note 151, at 71; David A. Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay
Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867, 876-84 (1982); Ray Yasser,
Strangulating Hearsay: The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 11 TEx. TECH L. REV.
587, 603-05 (1980).
155. People v. Bowers, 801 P.2d 511, 525 (Colo. 1990); see also infra notes 200-08 and
accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 179-91 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 159-78 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 192-207 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 91 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1035 (1980).
160. See, e.g., United States v. laconetti, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1041 (1977).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1978).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Hinkson, 632 F.2d 382, 386 (4th Cir. 1980).
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Fifth,163 Seventh,'" Eighth, 165 and Ninth 66 Circuits and the Court of
Military Appeals' 67 have considered corroborating evidence in their
analysis of the trustworthiness of out-of-court statements. Likewise,
several commentators have noted the importance of looking beyond
the circumstances surrounding the statement itself.' 68  In an article
written soon after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Pro-
fessor Yasser noted that the legislative history of the hearsay rule
mandated that courts construe the exceptions liberally. 69  Some
courts have gone so far as to require the presence of corroborating
evidence before admitting a statement under the residual exception. 7 °
In United States v. Thevis, ' the court constructed a two-tier test to
analyze the trustworthiness of an out-of-court statement. Under the
Thevis test, a court should first examine circumstances surrounding
the making of the statement and then determine whether there is cor-
roborating extrinsic evidence. 72 The statement can be admitted only
if both prongs are satisfied. "3 Commentators have properly criticized
this rigid formulation as inconsistent with the drafters' intentions. 174
163. See, e.g., United States v. Hitsman, 604 F.2d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1979).
164. See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 833 (1979). But see Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 293 (7th Cir. 1979)
(considering only circumstances surrounding the making of the statement).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Van Lufkins, 676 F.2d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 1982).
166. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
906 (1981). But see Karme v. Commissioner, 673 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982) (considering only
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 22 M.J. 141, 145 (C.M.A. 1986).
168. See, e.g., MYERS, supra note 31, § 5.38; Graham, supra note 30, at 532; Yun, supra
note 3, at 1758; Jeff R. Hanrahan, Note, Rules 803(24) and 804(B)(5)-The Residual
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 516, 519 (1979) ("Corroborating
circumstances [are] ... important... in determining trustworthiness.").
169. Yasser, supra note 154, at 608. Professor Yasser noted that "the 'equivalency'
requirement would not be difficult to meet, given the well-recognized fact of the unreliability of
much of the traditionally admitted hearsay." Id. While not specifically advocating
corroboration as the determining factor in an analysis of trustworthiness, Yasser saw no harm
in its use. Id. at 604-05.
170. See United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 665
F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982).
Although the common law did not require the corroboration of the testimony of an
alleged rape victim, 7 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2061, at 451 (James H. Chadbourn
rev. ed. 1978), many jurisdictions adopted such a requirement "based palusibly on the laudable
purpose of protecting against false accusations," id. § 2061, at 457. See, e.g., United States v.
Huff, 442 F.2d 885, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See generally Laura Lane, Note, The Effects of the
Abolition of the Corroboration Requirement in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 36 CATH. U. L.
REV. 793 (1987) (discussing the corroboration requirement). On corroboration and child
sexual abuse hearsay exception statutes, see infra notes 192-207.
171. 84 F.R.D. at 63.
172. Id. at 63.
173. Id. at 66-68; see also United States v. Turner, 475 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
174. Sonenshein, supra note 154, at 883 ("[N]o requirement of corroboration exists as a
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The majority of courts that do examine corroborating evidence,
however, consider the presence or absence of corroboration as only
one factor in their overall analysis of a statement's trustworthiness.
For example, in United States v. Cree,115 the defendant challenged her
assault conviction on the grounds that the child's hearsay statement
lacked the necessary guarantees of trustworthiness. 17 6 At trial, the
judge allowed a clinical social worker to testify to the content of inter-
views she had conducted with the child victims, in which they
described specific instances of abuse. 177 The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the admission of the statements for several reasons.
First, it noted that the statements were trustworthy because they were
"substantiated by extensive, objective medical evidence of injuries that
easily could have resulted from the abusive acts [of the defendant]
stated by [the child] to have occurred."'1 7 The court also recognized
several other factors suggesting the trustworthiness of the child's
statement: the child had previously claimed that Cree had hit him
with a belt; at trial, the child became excited when shown the items
that he claimed had been used to beat him; and the child's young age
suggested no motive to fabricate such an accusation.1
79
2. CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME THE STATEMENT WAS MADE
Huff v. White Motor Corp. 10 is the leading case that prohibits
inquiry into the presence or absence of corroborating evidence to
determine the trustworthiness of an out-of-court statement. Jesse
Huff was driving a truck designed by the defendant when it jackknifed
and caught fire.'81 Huff was burned in the fire and died nine days
later. ' 2 While in the hospital, Huff told some visitors that his pant
leg had caught on fire, and he had lost control of his truck while try-
ing to extinguish the fire.' 8 3 Huff's widow sought to introduce her
husband's statement at trial under the residual hearsay exception. On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit refused to consider Huff's statement:
precondition to the admissibility of evidence under one of the enumerated exceptions."). For
criticism of the analysis of corroborating evidence in general, see infra notes 186-91 and
accompanying text.
175. 778 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1985).
176. Id. at 477.
177. Id. at 476. The interviews were videotaped and made available to the defense well
ahead of trial. Id. at 476 n.4.
178. Id. at 477.
179. Id. at 477-78.
180. 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979).
181. Id. at 289.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 290.
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"Because the presence or absence of corroborative evidence is irrele-
vant in the case of a specific exception, it is irrelevant here, where the
guarantees of trustworthiness must be equivalent to those supporting
specific exceptions." '184 The court limited inquiry to only those cir-
cumstances "that existed when the statement was made."1 5
Although only a minority of the courts have adopted this
approach,186 some commentators consider it as "the view most consis-
tent with the 'trustworthiness' language of the residual exceptions." 187
Proponents of this approach argue that "the presumed reliability of
hearsay exceptions focused on the circumstances under which the
statement [is] made," so it would be inappropriate to look beyond
those circumstances in analyzing the admissibility of a statement
under the residual hearsay exception. 188  Simply stated,
"[c]orroboration does not insure trustworthiness." 189 Another prob-
lem in considering corroborating circumstances is the "necessity"
standard imposed by the residual exceptions. 190 The necessity stan-
dard often results in an evidentiary paradox: "The more 'trustwor-
thy' a statement becomes because of corroboration, the less necessary
would be its admission." 91 Finally, proponents argue that "consider-
ation of extrinsic factors ... is inconsistent with the implicit assump-
tions made by Congress in adopting the federal rules."1 92
3. CORROBORATION AND CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE HEARSAY
EXCEPTIONS
By 1982, at least six states had adopted statutes that require a
184. Id. at 293. The court recognized that some circuits did examine corroborating
evidence, citing United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1978).
185. Huff, 609 F.2d at 292.
186. "[M]ost federal courts have looked to the existence of corroborating evidence or the
lack thereof to determine the reliability of hearsay statements not coming within one of the
traditional hearsay exceptions." Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3154 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). For those federal circuits that consider corroborating circumstances, see supra
text accompanying notes 136-44.
187. Sonenshein, supra note 154, at 883; see also Grant, supra note 154, at 97-99; Ross,
supra note 154, at 71-73.
188. Ross, supra note 154, at 71; see also Sonenshein, supra note 154, at 879. One
commentator noted flatly, "Corroboration... does not insure trustworthiness." Frank, supra
note 30, at 397. But see infra notes 215-17 (discussing the use of corroborating evidence in
establishing res gestae exceptions).
189. Frank, supra note 30, at 397-98 & n.54.
190. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
191. Ross, supra note 154, at 72; see also Frank, supra note 30, at 402 ("If the prosecution
has strong corroboration of the abuse, there is little need for hearsay. If, however, the evidence
is inconclusive, the state may need the hearsay to prove its case."); Sonenshein, supra note 154,
at 879-80.
192. Ross, supra note 154, at 72. But see infra notes 214-17.
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court to consider corroborating evidence in determining whether to
admit hearsay statements made by child witnesses in child sexual
abuse cases. 193 By 1990, as Justice Kennedy noted in his dissenting
opinion in Wright, over eighteen states had adopted such statutes.' 94
The Washington statute, which served as a model for other states,' 95
provides for the admission of a child's statement, if (1) that statement
describes "any act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by
another," if the circumstances surrounding the making of the state-
ment provide "sufficient indicia of reliability," and (2) the child-
declarant testifies or the child is unavailable to testify and there is
corroborating evidence of the crime. 96 These requirements are more
stringent than the constitutional minimum, as the party seeking
admission of the statement must show more than mere sufficient
"indicia of reliability."' 97 Although academics have disagreed over
their constitutionality, 9 the statutes have rarely been challenged in
the courts.' 99 These statutes may be the best solution to the various
evidentiary problems presented by child sexual abuse prosecutions. 2°°
The Colorado Supreme Court examined the relationship between
corroboration for a child sexual abuse hearsay exception statute and
corroboration for Confrontation Clause purposes in People v. Bow-
ers.2 ' The defendant's three-year-old daughter made statements
193. Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative
Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 811-12 (1985) (noting that Colorado, Indiana, Minnesota,
South Dakota, Utah, and Washington provided child hearsay statutes).
194. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3154 n.2 (1990) (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1416 (1989); ARK. R. EVID. 803(25)(A); CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 1228 (West 1990);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-29 (1987); FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1989); IDAHO CODE § 19-
3024 (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 115-10 (1989); IND. CODE § 35-37-4-6 (1988); MD.
CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-103.1 (1989); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3) (1988); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 13-1-403 (Supp. 1989); N.J. R. EVID. 63 (1989); N.D. R. EvID. 803(24); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460 (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5985.1
(1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (1990));
see also UNIF. R. EVID. 807 commentary to subdivision (a) (listing corroborative evidence
"[a]mong the factors that the court should consider in determining whether sufficient
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness exist to warrant admission of a recorded
statement").
195. Note, supra note 193, at 811.
196. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988).
197. Frank, supra note 30, at 392.
198. Compare Note, supra note 193, at 811 ("[tlhe language . . . reflects a genuine
attentiveness to the guidelines established in [Ohio v.] Roberts") with Frank, supra note 30, at
401 (the statute "fails to meet the Roberts requirement[s]").
199. But see State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197 (Wash. 1984). Ryan has been properly criticized.
See Note, supra note 193, at 821-22.
200. See Susan K. Datesman, Note, State v. Smith- Facilitating the Admissibility of Hearsay
Statements in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1352, 1362-63 (1986); Note, supra
note 193, at 817.
201. 801 P.2d 511 (Colo. 1990).
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implicating her father in sexual 'abuse.202 The prosecution sought to
admit the child's statements under Colorado's child sexual abuse
hearsay statute.20  The court found that the statements met the relia-
bility prong of the statute, based on the "time, content, and circum-
stances" surrounding the making of the statements. 20 4 To meet the
corroboration prong, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of
the child's use of anatomically correct dolls.20 The Colorado court
found this showing insufficient, stating that evidence must be
"independent of and supplementary to the child's hearsay state-
ment" 20 6 to be corroborative. The court listed several examples:
testimony from an eyewitness, other than theunavailable child-vic-
tim, whose statement is offered into evidence, that the offense
occurred; statements of other children who were present when the
act was committed against the victim; medical or scientific evi-
dence indicating that the child was sexually assaulted; expert opin-
ion evidence that the child-victim experienced post-traumatic
stress consistent with the perpetration of the offense described by
the child; evidence of other similar offenses committed by the
defendant; the defendant's confession to the crime; or other
independent evidence, including competent and relevant expert
opinion testimony, tending to establish the commission of the act
described in the child's statement.20 7
Although the court specifically limited its analysis of corroborating
evidence to the statutory construction issue, it noted the common
sense argument favoring corroboration.20 8
B. Putting Corroboration to Work
Idaho v. Wright follows the Huff line of precedent,2" ending the
debate over the role of corroboration by requiring that "hearsay evi-
dence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by
virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evi-
dence at trial. 2 °10 The touchstone of the Supreme Court's analysis in
Wright is that the Confrontation Clause only permits a court to admit
202. Id. at 514-15.
203. COLO. STAT. REV. § 13-25-129 (1987) is similar to the Washington statute discussed
supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
204. Bowers, 801 P.2d at 521-22.
205. Id. at 522.
206. Id. at 525.
207. Id.; cf. Note, supra note 193, at 821.
208. Bowers, 801 P.2d at 255 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3153-54 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
209. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149-50 (1990).
210. Id. at 3150.
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
hearsay evidence with such trustworthiness that "'there is no mate-
rial departure from the reason of the general rule.' "21 The Court
would argue that the private nature of child sexual abuse makes the
child-victim's statements necessary.21 2 Wright states, however, that a
court must determine trustworthiness only from the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement. This reading is unsatisfy-
ingly narrow.
The residual exception should allow courts to admit evidence if it
is "necessary and trustworthy, relevant and material. '21 3 Although
the Confrontation Clause and the enumerated hearsay exceptions
require that an out-of-court statement be trustworthy, they do not
mandate a single method of inquiry into trustworthiness. Thus, the
Court's restraint in Wright is self-imposed and unnecessary. As Jus-
tice Kennedy notes throughout his dissent, the Supreme Court has
frequently examined corroborating evidence in analyzing
trustworthiness.21 4
One argument in favor of limiting analysis to the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement is that because the other
hearsay exceptions consider only the surrounding circumstances, the
residual exceptions must do so as well.21 5 This argument is without
merit. It is not clear that the specifically enumerated hearsay excep-
tions prohibit an inquiry into corroboration. Historically, courts have
required corroborating evidence as part of the so-called res gestae
exceptions. 2 6 The hearsay exception for records of regularly con-
ducted business activity also requires an analysis beyond the circum-
stances surrounding the statement.21 7 By the terms of the exception, a
statement is admissible only "if kept in the course of a regularly con-
ducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that busi-
ness activity to make the memorandum. ' 21 8 To obey the rule, courts
must look beyond the circumstances that existed when pen was put to
211. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
213. Dallas County v. Commercial Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 398 (5th Cir. 1961).
214. Wright, 110 S. Ct 3139, 3155-56 (citing Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990);
Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987); New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986); Lee v.
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970) (plurality opinion); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)).
215. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
216. The res gestae exceptions are now codified in FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(3). William G.
Passannante, Note, Res Gestae, The Present Sense Impression Exception and Extrinsic
Corroboration under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) and its State Counterparts, XVII
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89 (1989).
217. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
218. Id.
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paper, at the very least, to determine whether a log entry was of a
kind regularly made.
Wright states that the examination of corroborating evidence
"would permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by
bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial. 21 9
This concern is misplaced; the Court has already addressed this issue
in Bourjaily v. United States. 220 There, the Court allowed the admis-
sion of a co-conspirator's statement after determining that the state-
ment itself could be used in the examination of corroborating
circumstances.221 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that "a piece of evidence, unreliable in isolation, may become
quite probative when corroborated by other evidence. 222
Moreover, the presence or absence of corroborating evidence has
rarely been, and should not be, a "trump" in an analysis of trustwor-
thiness. Rather, it is properly one of many relevant factors to evalu-
ate,223 as illustrated in United States v. Dorian.224 In Dorian, the
defendant challenged his conviction for assault to commit rape on the
grounds that the child victim's out-of-court statements lacked suffi-
cient trustworthiness.225 The child appeared as a witness, but
"because of her age and obvious fright, she was unable to testify
meaningfully. ' 226 The trial judge allowed the child's foster mother to
testify about an interview in which the child described her father's
abusive conduct and acted out the contact with anatomically correct
dolls. On appeal, the panel examined "the reliability of the declara-
tion 'in light of the circumstances at the time of the declaration and
the credibility of the declarant.' ",227 The court relied on several crite-
ria in its finding of trustworthiness: the training of the interviewers
and their testimony that they did not use leading questions; the
defense's opportunity to cross-examine the interviewers extensively;
and the "graphic but child-like description of the incident. 228
Finally, the court noted the substantial corroborating evidence:
the descriptions of her fearful behavior around men; her terror
when the physician's assistant prepared to conduct a vaginal exam-
219. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3150 (1990).
220. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
221. Id. at 182-84.
222. Id. at 180.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 170-74.
224. 803 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1986).
225. Id. at 1444.
226. Id. at 1443.
227. Id. at 1444 (citing United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 440 (8th Cir. 1985)).
228. The child stated that her father" 'put his boy thing in the hole between my legs.'" Id.
at 1445.
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ination; her disturbed behavior when told she was going home,
which stopped when she learned her father would not be there; [the
defendant's] unprecedented act of washing [the child's] underwear;
and [the defendant's wife's] statements that [the defendant] was
trying to rape her daughter. Furthermore, the medical evidence,
although inconclusive, was certainly consistent with sexual
abuse.229
The corroborating evidence in Dorian, such as the child's behav-
ior and the medical examination findings, supported the factors sur-
rounding the making of the statement. Thus, the presence of
corroborating evidence strengthened the probability that the hearsay
statement was trustworthy. Yet the Court stated in Wright that the
Confrontation Clause demands that hearsay evidence, to be admissi-
ble, must be "so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant
would be of marginal utility. '2 30 As one commentator has noted,
"cross-examination tests more than the reliability of the witnesses tes-
timony in light of the circumstances in which it was given. [It] also
tests the consistency of that testimony with other known facts."
231
Using the specifically enumerated, or "firmly rooted, ' 232 hearsay
exceptions as a standard, equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness are
not difficult to obtain.233
To further illustrate the practical implications of Wright, imagine
a situation where, during a bitter divorce and custody battle, a five
year-old child reveals that his father has sexually abused him. The
child makes the allegations to his teacher and later to his mother.
The child will not speak to therapists and is unable to testify at trial.
If a court looks solely to the circumstances surrounding the making of
the statement, it is unlikely that the statement would be admitted
under the residual exception--or any other hearsay exception in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Imagine further that a medical examina-
tion reveals symptoms consistent with sexual abuse, and the child has
recently begun to wet his bed, have nightmares, and becomes highly
agitated when his father is present. The problem with Wright is that
it does not allow a court to consider these crucial circumstances in
evaluating the trustworthiness of the child's statement.234
229. Id. State courts have also examined corroborative evidence in the determination of
credibility in child sexual abuse cases. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801 (Ariz. 1987).
230. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3150.
231. Note, supra note 193, at 822.
232. See Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3147; cf. Stanley A. Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted"
Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C. L. REV. 9, 12 (1987) (arguing that "firmly
rooted should not be synonymous with longevity").
233. See supra text accompanying note 169.
234. For other examples, see Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3153-54 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Although commentators disagree over the relationship between
corroborating evidence and trustworthiness, the states that have
adopted child sexual abuse hearsay statutes almost uniformly have
added corroboration requirement.235 Thus, the presence of the cor-
roboration requirement in these state statutes indicates that legisla-
tures value an inquiry into corroborating evidence, which may
support the admissibility of a statement not otherwise admissible if
the trustworthiness inquiry only focused on the circumstantial
indicators.
Commentators have further noted that the requirement of cor-
roborating evidence in the state stautes acts as a "necessary safe-
guard" against wrongful conviction.2 36 Indeed, an examination into
corroborating evidence for the admission of a statement under the
residual exception may also help protect the defendant's Confronta-
tion Clause rights. Although a lack of corroborating evidence should
not automatically disqualify the admission of the statement, it should
be a factor in the larger calculus of the statement's trustworthiness. If
the child's statement and the fact pattern suggests that some kind of
corroborating evidence should exist, the lack of such evidence should
influence the court's decision to deny its admission. For example, if a
child claims that the man who touched her had a scar on his stomach,
and the defendant does not, this too should be a factor in considering
whether to admit the child's statement if it does not otherwise appear
to be trustworthy from the circumstantial guarantees.
V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the majority's assertion in Wright, corroboration is
certainly a relevant factor in an evaluation of trustworthiness; after
Wright it is only an inappropriate one. In rejecting the restrictive test
proposed by the Idaho Supreme Court, both the majority and dissent
in Wright correctly recognized that real-world considerations fre-
quently prevent a hearsay statement from being made under condi-
tions that support trustworthiness. Unfortunately, Wright also
ignores the practices of a majority of states and federal courts of
appeals, and prohibits consideration of corroborating evidence that
would compensate for these practical difficulties while remaining
within the spirit of the rule.
The Federal Rules of Evidence includes the residual hearsay
exception to allow courts to admit necessary and trustworthy state-
ments into evidence, regardless of their label. Even under the strictest
235. Note, supra note 193, at 812.
236. Id. at 820.
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reading of the drafters' intention that the residual exception be used in
unusual and extraordinary circumstances, the circumstances sur-
rounding child sexual abuse cases are sufficiently compelling to war-
rant consideration of corroborating evidence.
Near the end of the 1990 Term, the Supreme Court made broad
hints that stare decisis will not prevent it from reconsidering recent
cases. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that
"[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases
involving property and contract rights; . . . the opposite is true in
cases.., involving procedural and evidentiary rules. ' 237 The Court
noted that in the last twenty years, it had overruled thirty-three con-
stitutional decisions, 238 and the dissent suggeted that more may fol-
low. 2 39 Rehnquist described three characteristics of cases that will be
frequently re-examined: (1) cases decided "by the narrowest of mar-
gins," (2) cases where the "basic underpinnings" of the decision have
been questioned by the Court, and (3) cases which the lower courts
have had difficulty in applying. 24 Considering the dynamic state of
child sexual abuse laws, Idaho v. Wright may prove to fall in all three
categories. Moreover, given that Justices Brennan and Marshall were
both in the five-to-four Wright majority and have since left the bench,
the Court is likely to reconsider whether corroboration should be in
the courtroom or out the window.
JOHN CLAIBORNE KOSKI
237. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2610 (1991).
238. Id.
239. See id. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]oday's majority ominously suggests that
an even more extensive upheaval of this Court's precedents may be in store.").
240. Id. at 2611.
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